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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

What is the duty of a landlord to a

commercial tenant under a monthly rental arrangement?
2.

Is a landlord obligated to protect tenants

from the criminal attacks of third parties?
3.

Did the appellant-landlord breach his duty

toward respondent?
4.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error

in failing to give the appellant's requested instructions
regarding the duty of a landlord towards his commercial
tenant?
5.

Did the plaintiffs lay adequate foundation

for the admission of their exhibits relating to losses of
inventory?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature,

This is an appeal from a jury verdict

for damages allegedly suffered by the respondents when
unknown criminals burglarized their store*

At the time

of the loss, respondents were renting on a monthly basis
the premises from appellant.
Course and disposition in court below.

On

September 12, 1984, respondents filed their complaint in
the court below based on the negligence of appellant in
renting to a particular tenant or in making holes in the
floor of an apartment above the jewelry store for repair
work.

(R. 8-11) .

The case was assigned to the Honorable

James S. Sawaya.
The matter was tried before a jury from May
21-24, 1985.

At the close of the respondents1 case,

appellant moved for a directed verdict.

(R. 553-555).

The Court denied the Motion for Directed Verdict.

(R.

561-562).
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
respondents.

Judgment was entered on the verdict.

216-218) .
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(R.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondents brought this action in the court
below when unknown criminals burglarized their jewelry
business.

The thrust of their complaint was that the

appellant was negligent in renting to a particular tenant
of reputed bad character and in cutting holes in a floor
in an apartment above their business.

(R. 2-7, 44-46).

Entry into the store was made through Apartment
214, which was directly above the store.

(R. 278). This

was one of the four apartments which were directly above
the respondents1 store.

(R. 353, 612). Appellant had

cut several holes in the wood floor of Apartment 214 to
locate water leaks and repair the pipes.

(R. 224, 643).

Appellant was remodelling the upstairs floor and was
changing the entire layout of that particular apartment.
(R. 382, 645). During that remodelling, the door to
Apartment 214 was usually kept locked.

(R. 339).

There were three layers of flooring between the
apartment and the respondents1 sales area.

There was the

wood floor of the apartment, approximately 14 inches
below that layer was a three-quarter inch layer of lath

-3-

and plaster, consisting of one-half inch plaster and
one-quarter inch wood, and below that was the false
ceiling to the respondents1 store.

(R. 225-27, 648-49).

Appellant worked on the piping in the space between the
apartment's floor and the lath and plaster, having never
penetrated the lath and plaster into the respondents'
store.

(R. 227, 647-50, 658). He did not penetrate into

the lath and plaster because all of the repairs were
effected above it and he assumed the respondents had the
ceiling tied into their burglar alarm.

(R. 648-49).

The evening before the burglary, appellant had
been unable to enter Apartment 214.

He discovered

someone had entered the room without permission.
231-34) . He entered the room and examined it.
was present and nothing was disturbed.
then locked the windows and the door.
350-54).

(R.
No one

(R. 231-34) . He
(R. 234-37,

He had assumed a transient had sought shelter

from the winter storm, but he did not see any
unauthorized persons in the area.

(R. 237, 354). Later

that evening, the apartment manager unlocked the room and
made an examination.
the windows and door.

He found all was secure, including
(R. 370, 377-79, 388). He also

saw no strangers in the area.

(R. 337).

-4-

The next morning, the manager went to the room
to continue the reconstruction and discovered someone had
burglarized the apartment by breaking a locked window and
entering.

(R. 371). He also found the burglars had

penetrated the lath and plaster layer and entered the
jewelry store with a rope ladder.
the police department.

(R. 371). He called

(R. 372).

The Murray Police Department responded to the
scene.

The investigation revealed the burglars were a

sophisticated group.

(R. 219). Detective Christensen of

the Murray Police Department had never seen this
sophisticated of a group of thievesf even though he had
investigated hundreds of burglaries.

(R. 213). The

thieves "shaved" the alarm boxesf both the inside and
outside.

(R. 312) .

burglary system.

They were able to deactivate the

Apparently, a circular saw was used.

(R. 312) . He checked with the burglar alarm company
which had installed the security system, and its
personnel could not assist him with the method of
"shaving."

(R.313).

Neither the police department or

the alarm company possessed this type of instrument.

(R.

313, 580). The police could not locate fingerprints and
assumed gloves had been used by the group of thieves.
(R. 296, 307-09).

The thieves carried off a safe,

-5-

which would have taken two to three personsf according to
the police officer (R. 309-10) , and possibly an excess of
four persons, according to respondent Virgil Steadman (R.
453).

The burglars came well prepared in that they

brought with them railroad ties to help load the safe
onto a vehicle.

(R. 308) •

These ties were left at the

scene and were examined by the apartment manager as well
as the police.

The apartment manager testified that the

railroad ties had not been used in the reconstruction
process and these particular ties were not present before
the discovery of the burglary.

The ties had been cut

into a wedge shape in order to facilitate rolling a safe
up them.

(R. 382-85; Ex. 5).
The thieves were also of sufficient

sophistication that they avoided the internal sensors of
the store.

They avoided the trip devices located in the

display cases which contained merchandise (R. 302, 448,
479, 480)f and under the floor pads, (R. 303, 450, 479).
In fact, the group was sophisticated enough to avoid that
part of the ceiling which had been "bugged" by the
respondents.

(R. 451-53).

They had armed about a 10 by

20 foot area of their 20 by 60 foot ceiling because of a
previous burglary attempt which had occurred before

-fi-

appellant had bought the building.

(R. 492-93, 495-96).

The thieves also avoided the armed floor pad and display
cases directly underneath their ladder.

(R. 484-85).

Infact, they stepped onto that case in descending into the
store.
The crime has never been solved.

(R. 218f 443).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

A landlord owes no duty to a commercial

tenant under a monthly tenancy.
premises "as is."

The tenant accepts the

It is the tenant's obligation to

examine the premises for their adequacy and any potential
problems they may present.

In fact, no testimony

regarding the duty of the landlord was ever adduced at
trial through any of the witnesses.

No standard was

articulated to the jury in terms of any instructions.
2.

A landlord is not the insurer of the safety

of his tenant and cannot be obligated to protect that
tenant from the criminal attacks of unknown third
parties.

Under the facts of this casef appellant

landlord has been made the guarantor of the respondent
tenants' safety, without any evidence showing he acted
unreasonably.
3.

The proximate cause of the respondents'

damages was the burglary committed by unknown third
parties.

The court erred when it failed to give the
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instructions requested by appellant regarding the duty of
care of a landlord and the instructions relating to
intervening cause.

Moreover, there was no evidence the

burglars and their success were connected to the
respondent.

Since the court never defined the duty of

the respondent the jury was left with no standard by
which to judge the acts or failure to act of the
respondent and compare that to the criminal attacks of
the intervening third parties.
4.

The respondents1 entire evidence of damages

consisted of a list prepared after the burglary and for
which no adequate foundation was laid for its submission.
There was no evidence qualifying any of their witnesses
to give value of the items on that list.

This is not the

typical case of an owner testifying to value of a
possession.

Even if such were the circumstance, there

must be foundation for that opinion.

In this case,

precious gems, metals, and jewelry were the items lost.
These materials1 values are not within the knowledge of
the average person.

Their values must be established by

competent expert testimony.

The list further did not

qualify as a summary document since no adequate
foundation was laid for its admission.

The entire

evidence of damages lacked foundation under the

exceptions to the hearsay rule and through competency of
the witnesses through which it was introduced.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A COMMERCIAL TENANT UNDER A MONTHLY
TENANCY ACCEPTS THE PREMISES "AS
IS", AND THE LANDLORD OWES NO DUTY
OF PROTECTION TO THE TENANT.
The plaintiffs, conducting a jewelry business,
were renting from appellant Brown on a monthly tenancy;
they did not want a lease.

(R.425).

There was no

warranty regarding the premises ever extended by the
appellant Brown.

In Jesperson v. Deseret News, 119 Ut.

235, 240-41, 225 P.2d 1050, 1053 (1951), this court set
forth the landlordfs duty to a tenant regarding leased
premises.

This court held:

...The condition of the premises
was equally apparent to both lessor
and lessee. No warranty was
included in the lease that the
premises would sustain the weights
proposed to be placed on it by the
lessee. Under such circumstances,
the tenant took the risk of the
premises as they were. See Powell
v. Johnny Hughes Orphanage, supra,
(148 Virginia 331, 138 S.E. 367),
wherein the court quotes from 16
R.C.L. Section 270 as follows:
f
In the absence of warranty, deceit
or fraud on the part of the
landlord, the rule of caveat emptor
applies to the lease of the real
estate, the control of which passes
to the tenant to make examination
of the demised premises to
determine their safety and
adaptability to the purpose for
which they are hired.1
-Q-

This is the general rule and has been recognized by other
jurisdictions in cases of similar facts.

In Robiceaux v.

Roy, 352 So.2d 766 (Louisianaf 1977) , the Louisiana court
addressed the very issue before this court.

The

plaintiff in that case had leased space from the landlord
to conduct a jewelry business.

The landlord rented

adjoining premises to another individual.

Shortly

afterwardsf unknown persons broke through a common wall
between the two premises.
burglarized.

The jewelry store was

The Louisiana court held that the landlord

was not liable for the burglary because the landlord had
no duty to protect the tenant against disturbances by
third persons with no right to enter.

See alsoy Peter

Piper Tailoring Company v. Dobbin, 192 S.W. 1044 (Mo.
1917) for a recitation of the same rule.
The plaintiffs knew reconstruction was taking
place, because they had been upstairs and could actually
hear the work in progress.

(R.463).

Mr. Brown had also

told Mr. Virgil Steadman the general terms about the
reconstruction process.

(R.346) . No intrusions from the

repair work occurred to the plaintiffs1 rented premises.
(Id.).

During the repairs, Mr. Brown did penetrate the

floor to an apartment above the plaintiffs1 store.
(R.647-50).

The intrusion did not go through the lath

-in-

and plaster which separated the premises leased by the
plaintiffs from the apartment floor nor through the false
ceiling of the plaintiffs1 store.

The false ceiling was

directly below the lath and plaster layer.

On the day of

the burglary, the plaintiffs were renting exactly what
they had been renting during their entire tenancy—a
jewelry store from the floor to the false ceiling and up
to the lath and plaster.

No warranty had been extended

regarding their security.

They could have ascertained

the adequacy of the premises better than appellant Brown.
In factf Mr. Brown assumed the plaintiffs had extended
their burglar alarm system through the entire ceiling.
(Id.) . Mr. Virgil Steadman knew of a previous burglary
attempt which had occurred through the ceiling years
before Mr. Brown bought the building.
informed Mr. Brown of this attempt.
651).

It was he who had
(R.453-54, 455-56,

The only protective steps taken were to "bug" only

a portion of the ceiling instead of the entire ceiling
because of the costs involved.

(Id.).

Therefore, the

plaintiffs took the risks of the premises as they were.
They had knowledge superior to appellant's knowledge and
took no further steps to protect themselves.

_ii-

POINT II
A LANDLORD IS NOT THE INSURER OF
THE SAFETY OF HIS TENANT AND OWES
NO DUTY TO PROTECT HIM FROM THE
CRIMINAL ATTACKS OF THIRD PARTIES.
This court has decided no cases bearing directly
on this point.

Other jurisdictions have considered

similar issues.

In King v. Ilikai Properties, 632 P.2d

657 (Hawaii, 1981), the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed
summary judgment for a landlord when sued by a tenant who
had been assaulted in the landlords1 condominium*

The

court held absent a special relationship between them,
the landlord had no duty to protect the plaintiff-tenant
from criminal attacks by third parties.

In Davis v.

Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976), the
Oklahoma court affirmed summary judgment for the
supermarket when sued by a customer who was assaulted in
the parking lot.

The court held no duty was imposed upon

the store to protect against the criminal acts of third
parties*

The court held the store was not an insurer of

the safety of its customers.

The closest Utah case is

Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982), where this
court affirmed the trial courtfs reversal of a jury
verdict in favor of a patron of a bowling alley.

The

patron was assaulted by a member of another bowling team.

The proprietor was aware of the fact the plaintiff had
reported tension and animosity between his team and the
assailants' team.

This court held:

The proprietor of a public
amusement has no duty to anticipate
violence when neither the person
exhibiting the violence nor others
connected with him have previously
engaged in any potentially violent
activities. A proprietor has a
duty to use ordinary care and
diligence to protect patrons, but
this duty does not extend to
becoming an insurer of their
safety.
Id. at 695.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs seek to hold
appellant Brown as an insurer of their safety.

The

record is devoid of any evidence of the criminal nature
of the first intruders in the apartment and their
connection, if any, with the burglars.

Mr. Brown assumed

that transients may have been seeking shelter from the
storm in the first instance.

He checked and secured the

room, personally and through his manager.

In both

instances there was no evidence of any attempt to
penetrate into the jewelry store.

(R.335, 350, 370-71,

377-78, 388). In fact, Mr. Brown was a victim of the
burglary in that the unknown parties broke a locked
window to enter the apartment.

They then broke through

_T O —

the lath and plaster layer.

(R.350f 371f 656; Exhibit

1-1, 20). In the first intrusion, there was no evidence
of any criminal activity.
care and diligence.
door.

Appellant Brown used ordinary

He locked the windows and locked the

Moreover, the court committed reversable error

when it refused appellant Brown's Instruction Number 22
(R.186), advising the jury the landlord is not an insurer
of the safety of the tenants, and Instruction Number 21
(R.185), that the landlord is not obligated to protect
the tenant from the criminal acts of third parties.
The trial court failed to give the instructions
requiring a special duty to be proven before liability
may be imposed on the landlord.

Without the particular

instructions, sought by appellant Brown, the jury was
left with the impression that a landlord was an insurer
or guarantor of the safety of the tenant.

Moreover, the

plaintiffs produced no evidence of the landlord's duty of
care.

No such standard is articulated in the record or

in the instructions.
POINT III
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
PLAINTIFFS1 INJURIES WAS THE
INTERVENING CRIMINAL ACT OF THIRD
PARTIES FOR WHICH THE APPELLANT
CANNOT BE LIABLE.
Other jurisdictions have considered similar
issues to the case at bar.

In McCappin v. Park Capital
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Corporation 126 A.2d 51 (N. J, 1956) , the court faced a
problem of a tenant who had lost money from her apartment
when no forced entry had been made.

The landlordfs

superintendent had kept the keys to all the apartments on
a peg board, which eventually was moved to an area of
common access.

Several keys were found missing,

including the key to the plaintifffs apartment.

At

approximately the same time of that discovery, her
apartment was entered without force and she suffered a
loss.

The trial court had found for the tenant and the

appellate court reversed.

It held that no proximate

cause had been established between the missing keys and
the loss of the money and granted judgment to the
landlord.

Similarly, in Panglorne v. Weiss, 90 A. 1024

(N. J. 1914), a New Jersey court held the landlord was
not liable to a tenant where the landlord had removed the
lock to the tenantfs door in order to effect repairs when
a burglary occurred.

Additionally, in Andrews v. Kinsel,

40 S.E. 300 (Georgia, 1901), the court refused relief to
the tenants based on a negligence theory where the
landlord had left the windows open in an adjoining
tenantfs premises, after having removed for purposes of
repair of partition between the plaintiff's premises and
the other tenant's premises.

The court held that the

intervening theft, not the landlord's negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss.

In the instant case,

testimony demonstrates that Mr. Brown acted reasonably.
He had cut holes in the apartment floor in order to
effect repairs.

He was attempting to locate leaks and

was eventually reconstructing the entire room including
the plumbing.

(R. 382, 645). There is no evidence that

he acted unreasonably.
The trial court refused to give appellant
Brown's requested Instructions Numbers 20, 21, and 22, as
cited supra.

The court further compounded this error

when it refused to give appellant Brown's Instruction
Number 23 (R.187), that when two causes for an injury
exist and are independent of each other, the later and
intervening cause is generally the proximate cause of the
loss.

This instruction quotes verbatim the law in Utah

in Cooke v. Mortensen, 624 P.2d 675 (Utah 1981).

The

court's refusal to give these instructions, especially in
light of the fact the court gave Instruction Number 10
(R.97) compounded the error.

The jury in effect was left

with the impression that it could find liability for the
criminal conduct of third parties without measuring that
conduct in the context of the landlord's duty toward his
tenant.

The record is devoid of any evidence the system
was defeated because of the hole in the floor.

In factf

the hole did not penetrate into the plaintiffs1 premises;
it was restricted entirely to the apartment upstairs.
Mr. Brown was engaged in legitimate conduct in effecting
reconstruction of the apartment.

He took reasonable

steps to secure the premises by locking the door and
locking the windows.

Notwithstanding these stepsf

unknown criminal parties burglarized his apartment/ broke
through the lath and plaster ceiling and entered the
plaintiffs' premises.
system.

Theref they defeated the burglary

This was a very sophisticated group of burglarsf

so much so that even the security system personnel and
investigating officer may not have been able to have
performed the same operation.

(R. 321, 580).

POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO LAY ADEQUATE FOUNDATION
FOR THE ADMISSIONS OF THEIR ADMISSION OF THEIR
EXHIBITS RELATING TO INVENTORY LOSSES.
Rule 702f Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
If scientific/ technical/ or other
special knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact in
issuef a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge/ skill/
experience, training or education/
may testify thereto and form an
opinion or otherwise.
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Audrey Steadmanf secretary of Steadman
Enterprises, Inc., took the stand and began to testify
about Exhibit 6, a list of losses sustained by the
plaintiffs.

(R.398, 487-88).

She testified the

plaintiffs assembled as a committee and began to list
their apparent losses.

Appellant objected to the

admission of that exhibit as lacking the requisite
foundation either as a document or her expertise in
testifying to value.
objections.

The trial court overruled the

She went on to testify to the value of her

own diamond ring over objection foundation regarding the
value.

(R.410-11).

She did not even know where the

diamond was purchased (R.427), its value (R.428),
cost.

(R.428-30).

or its

In fact, Mr. Virgil Steadman, her

husband, an officer of the corporation, testified she did
not know about pricing.

(R.468).

Rodney Steadman eventually was called to the
stand and through him Exhibit 10 (logbook) (R. 510) was
entered into

evidence over the appellant's objections to

foundation regarding the values.

(R.510, 512). The same

objection was made for Exhibits 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 8, and 18.

(R.510-24).

These exhibits comprise the

plaintiffs1 entire evidence of their losses.

Nowhere in

the direct examination of Virgil Steadman or Rodney

Steadman was there any evidence of the foundation for
compiling these exhibits or for the values contained
within them.

Neither was ever qualified to give any

opinion regarding the values.

No evidence is in the

record regarding the expertise of any of the individuals
who testified regarding these particular exhibits.

The

trial testimony mentioned lists which were never
produced.

None of the witnesses attempting to lay the

foundation for these exhibits was ever qualified as a
jeweler or an expert in the field of precious gems and
metals and jewelry items.

The court allowed a list to

come in for value without any foundation regarding that
value.

There was no evidence of the "knowledge, skill,

experience, trainingf or education," to testify to an
opinion or otherwise regarding the values of any of these
exhibits.
Further, the foundation for these exhibits was
lacking to allow them in as hearsay exceptions.

They did

not qualify as records of regularly conducted activities
as allowed under Rule 803 (6) , Utah Rules of Evidence,
since no foundation was layed they were kept in the
course of regularly conducted activity.

In fact, they

could not so qualify because the lists were constructed
after the loss.

Further, if these exhibits were offered

as summaries, the plaintiffs failed again to lay the
necessary foundation.

Rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence,

provides that the underlying data for summaries must be
produced in court.

The underlying data was not produced

in court in the instant case and the plaintiffs did not
carry their burden of making the records available.

Gull

Labs, Inc. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756 (Utah
1978).

The testimony regarding values did not qualify as

owners giving opinion regarding the value of their own
property.

No such foundation is in the record.

Moreover

these exhibits were values of specialized
items—jewelry—which require expert testimony and the
proper foundation for an individual so testifying.
record is devoid of any such foundation.

The

Therefore, the

appellant was seriously prejudiced in that the only
evidence of value given at trial did not meet any of the
necessary foundational requirements.
CONCLUSION
There is no duty owed toward a tenant in a
commercial monthly tenancy by the landlord.
accepts the premises "as is,f.

The tenant

The landlord cannot be the

guarantor or insurer of the safety of the tenant.

The

landlord cannot be required to protect the tenant from
the world at large.

The evidence is deficient in showing

what the landlord's duty of care was under the
circumstances.

The record is totally devoid of any

evidence that the appellant landlord acted or failed to
act unreasonably.
opposite.

In fact, the evidence is just the

He was engaged in a legitimate and socially

useful operation of reconstructing an apartment.

He

locked and secured the doors and windows to that
apartment.

Unknown burglars broke into his apartment and

then broke through a ceiling layer into the respondents1
premises, a premises inadequately protected by a burglary
alarm system of which only they knew its particular
shortcomingsf with the exception of the burglars
themselves.
The trial court committed reversible error when
it failed to grant the appellantfs motion for a directed
verdict at the close of the respondents1 case.

It

allowed the case to go to the jury without articulating
for them the standard of care under a commercial tenancy.
It failed to instruct the jury about the special
circumstances of such a tenancy.

Moreover/ the trial

court allowed the matter to go to the jury without any
instructions regarding the duty owed by a landlord to a
tenant.

The court refused the appellantfs instructions

submitted on that duty and gave them no guidelines to

judge the appellantfs conduct.

The court left the jury

with the impression that the landlord, in effect,
guaranteed the safety of the tenant from attacks of
criminal third parties.

Further, when the court refused

the appellantfs instruction on proximate cause and
intervening cause, it gave the jury no guideline for
evaluating liability for the criminal acts of third
parties.
Therefore, appellant asks this Court to reverse
the judgment and order the trial court to enter judgment
in its favor.
DATED this

(D

day of December, 1985.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

'Mil

T. fSl TSAKALOS
Attorney for Appellant

ADDENDUM
Instruction No. 10f given by the Court (R. 97)
Instruction No. 20, requested by appellant (R. 184)
Instruction No. 21, requested by appellant (R. 185)
Instruction No. 22, requested by appellant (R. 186)
Instruction No. 23, requested by appellant (R. 187)
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I hereby certify that I hand delivered four true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT on
this

4r\

day of December, 1985, to:

Lee Bishop
Attorney at Law
350 South 400 East #203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

INSTRUCTION NO.

The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequencer produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.

It is the efficient

cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury.
Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence produces the injury without which the result
would not have occurred.

The fact that the instrumentality which

produced the injury was criminal conduct of a third person would
not preclude a finding of proximate cause if the intervening
agency was itself a foreseeable act.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Plaintiffs rented the premises under a monthly tenancy
and not under a written lease.
Under Utah law, a tenant of a commercial building
accepts the risks of the premises "as is" and the landlord owes
no duty of protection toward him*
It is, therefore, the duty of the tenant to examine the
premises and determine their suitability.

Jesperson v. Deseret News Publishing Company, (Ut. 1951) 225
P.2d 1050; Wolfe v. Wite, (Ut. 1948) 197 P.2d 125.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Zl

A landlord has no duty to protect a tenant from the
criminal attacks of third parties.

King v. Ilikai Propertiesy (Haw. 1981) 632 P.2d 657.

INSTRUCTION NO .

Zl

A landlord is not an insurer of the safety of his
tenants.

He has no duty to anticipate the criminal conduct of

third parties.

Robicheaux v. Roy, (La. 1977) 352 S.2d 766; McCappin v. Park
Capitol Corporation, (N.J. 1956) 126 Atl.2d) 51; Panglorne v.
Weiss, (N.J. 1914) 90 Atl. 1024; Andrews v. Kinsel, (Ga. 1901) 40
S.E. 300; Teallv v. Harlow, (Mass. 1951) 176 N.E. 533.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Z3

When there exists two possible causes for an injury, and
these causes are independent of each other, the later and
intervening cause is generally to be viewed as the proximate
cause of the accident.

Cooke v. Mortensen, (Ut. 1981) 624 P.2d 675.

